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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MARCELLA JENSEN T·UT~TLE
and RfCHARD DALE ·TUTTLE,
a minoT, by his Guardian ad Litem,
~farcella Jensen Tuttle,
Plaintiffs~~

Respo!ftid;ernts,
Case No.
7619

vs.
PACIFIC INTERMO·UNTAIN EXPRESS·, a corporation, and HEATH
H. C:ORNET·TE.,
Defe'fiAft(}JYtts arnd AppelZam;ts.

BRIEF O·F APPELLANT:S

I.
S·TATE·ME·NT OF F·.AC:TS
This action was brought by M-a~cella J ens·en :Tuttle
and Richard Dale Tuttle, the widow and minor chi'ld,
respe'Ctively, of Dale Tuttle, deceas~e·d, to recover damages
for his death resulting from an automoibile col'lision
which occurred January 15, 1949· at about 8 :30 P.M. on
the main highway, U. !S. 91, between Provo and S·pringville.
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.A!t the S!eene of the ~accident the highway has four
marked :paved lanes with gravel shoulders, and runs
southeasterly, substantially straight, although turning slightly to the left or east as one !proceeds toward
S'p·ringville. ·The: seene of the aecident was illustrated
by 'two drawings, E:rlribits. FF. and GG, a substantial
dup~cate· of whi,ch is here:after inserted.

;Snowpilows had cleared the road, leaving snowbanks
on the shoulders. Prucked snorw co;vered the· center lanes,
the outer lanes bein·g substantially cleared by the traffic,
as shown hy the p•ietures, Exhibits 11, 7, 5, and 6.
Defendant Heath H. Corn·ette was driving a large
tractor 'and trailer :for the Pacific Intermountain Ex:press.
He ie.ft Provo going south, travelling in the lane of traffic
next west of the center. His speed was estimated at from
40 to something slightly in excess of 50 miles per hour.
Just after passing Lou's Place (located on the west side
of the highway) he, Cornette, undertook to pasts. two
passenger cars travelling in the same direction in the
west lane of traffic. After sounding his horn and 'blinking his lights to indicate his intention to pass he succeeded in overtaking the first ear ·driven by ·Claudius E.
s.tevenson. Continuing to sound his. horn he was about
to pass the second ear, a blue Plymouth driven by deceased, when the latte·r suddenly and without giving any
wa~ing turned left into the center lane as though
m'aking a U turn immediately in front of defendants'
truck, where it was struck hroadside (see 'Picture Exhibits
3 and 4). D'efendants' rig j·ruck-knifed as it and deeeased's
ear skidded across the highway onto the east side, where
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a telephone pole W'"as struek, eausing electric \vires to
drop to the pave1nent and flash as described by the several \vitnesses hereinafter mentione-d.
The foregoing facts are established by disinterested
eye. . witnesses., as \Veil as defendants' driver. Their testimony is corroborated hy the physical evidence.
Contrary to the foregoing facts, and in an obvious
effort to avoid the effects of deceased's own negligence,
~plaintiffs' counsel set out in the 'beginning to allege and
prove that deceased was traveling north upon the highway, rather than southerly.
In a desperate- effort to establish some grounds of
liability, numerous allegations of negligence, numbered
"a" to ''m," inclusive, were made in the original and
supplemental complaint. (Tr. 6-ll). At no time were any
of these mere allegations of negligen,ce conne~cted up, with
the accident or any proof made that any_ alleiged claim of
negligence was a proximate caruse of the collisiO'n. In
fact plaintiffs' theory of liability is, and was from the
beginning, based upon an -entirely false assumption of
fact, namely, that deceased W'as travelling north W'hen
in fact his course ~of travel w~as tow1ard the south.
The numerous unfounded allegations of negligence
(several o;f which were repetitious and should have been
stricken, on motion duly made by defendants) (Tr. 1415), together with the inconceivable num'ber of plaintiffs' requeste-d instrnctions-45 in all-(Tr. 150-196),
inje,cted various claims of negli·gence whic!h vvere not
supported by actual evidence and which created hope3
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less eonfusion on 1ssues submitted to the jury, giving
rise t.o numerous. pirejudicial errors.
'The ease was first tried before the Honorable R. L.
Tuckett, resulting in a ihung jury. It was again tried
hefore· the HonorabJe J oseplh E. Nelson, beginning May
15, 19·50, resulting in a v~rdict in p~aintiffs' favor in the
amount of $24,000.00 (T'r. 26~1). Defendants promptly
filed ~a motion for a directed verdict, notwithstanding the
verdict, and a notice and motion for a new trial (Tr. 2545). ·This motion filed May 29, 1950, was taken under
advisement until the trial ·court finally denied such
motions N ovemher 15, 1950. Notice of appeal to this
court was duly filed and perf~cted {D·. 267).

II.
S:T.ATEMENT OF p·QINIT:S
Defendants' motion for a directed verdict should
have heen ·granted on rat lea:st three· grounds, namely:
1.

(a) 'The collision was proximately -caused or
proximately contributed to by .deee~ased'IS own
neglige:nce:.
(ib) Plaintiffs failed to p~roiVe that dece,ase.d w·as
tnarveling north as claimed and alleged or any
·facts S'ufficient to constitute a eause of action.
Plaintiffs failed to prorve or establish proximate caJUse and the verdieJt necess·arily rests on
sp,eeulation and conjecture.
(c)

2. The court erred in instructing the· jury, such
err:ors being initiated hy the improp·er re·ques.ted instructions of pilaintiffs, .and in refusing defendants' requested
instructions, as follows :
4
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(a) The court erred in giving its instruction No.
13 (Tr. 233), improperly defining the duty of defendants and requiring a '' const(JJI'l_t Zo1ok:orut rn.ot
o-nly ·ahea.d b·ut to the s ,:des of his vehicle."
(b) The court erred in giving its instructions
Nos. 14 and 15 ( Tr. 234, 5), requiring defendants
aibsolutely ''to ·prevent or avoid collid;ing with
any person, vehicle or other oonvey1a(f/}ce," irregardless of circumstan·ces.
(c) T'he court erred in refusing to give defendants' requested instructions: Nos. 16 and 17 ('Tr.
213, 4) in explanation of any sp·eed as constituting or not con'Stituting a proximate cause.
(d) The court erred in ·giving its instructions
No.6 (Tr. 226) and No.9 (Tr. 229) and in pZacing
too much emphasis ·On so-called presumptiO'ns and
ilnferences not warramt.ed. by the evidence, and in
refusin·g defendants' requested instrU;Citions No.
7 ( Tr. 204) and No. 19 -( Tr. 216) in explanation
of the effect o;f actual evidence as orvercoming any
presumption of due care.
(e}. The court erred in giving its instruction No.
1 ~Tr. 219-·21) submitting all allegations unsupported by evidervc:e.
(f) 'The c'Ourt erred in giving instructions as
me.re abstract statements of law without app,lioation to the faots an-d circumsbamces, sueh as
,court's instructions Nos. 17, 18 and 19 CTr. 237-9)
and wrongfully denying defendants' requested
instructions No. 5 ('Tr. 202) No. 8 ('Tr. 205) No.
9 (Tr. 206), No. 10 ('Tr. 207) and N'O. 11 (Tr. 208)
in explanation of eontributory negligence and
eertain statutory and legal duties of deceased.
3. Plaintiffs' eounsel, through his own client, a
witness Carol Ellis., wrongfully injected insuranee indemnification.
5
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4. The eourt erre·d in denying defendants' motion
ror a new trial when the verdict was not only against
the great weight of the evidence but was contrary to
and against the evidence and When there was prejudicial
errors ~denying defendants a fair trial.

III.
EVIDENCE· AND· ARGUMEN'T·
1. DEF'END'ANTS'
VERDIC:T:.

M~OT'IO·N

FO·R A

DIREC~TE.D

Defendants' motion for a dire·cted ver~C.t was duly
made both at the close oif the evidenee (Tr. 453-4) and
after verdict (Tr. 254) as pennitted under Rule 50(b}
U.R.·C.P., the rHasons and groundssp,ecificallyenumerated
(;Tr. ~53.-4) are aJborve and hereafter stated under ~sub-
headings (a), (fb) -and (c). This matter necessitates a
summary of the evidenc·e relating to the manner in which
the accident ooourred. To ·assist in visualizing the surroundings. and aecident, we have inserted herein a repTo\..
duction of the map, plaintiffs' '''Exhibit GG" wh~h
should he eonsidere;d with the testimony of the various
witnesses.
I

6
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WITNE·S:SES
In explanation of the witnesses near enough to have
seen the accident we should 1nention that three ·of them,
John Martin l\1·cPhee, Irma 1\ticPhee, his wife, a.nd an
elderly gentleman, Ehner M. Roberts, were walking from
Lou's Place to the McPhee residence, a short dis·tanee.
south on the west side of the highway. Claudius E.
Stevenson and Carol Ellis were riding in the passenger
car in the west lane of traffic following the Plymouth
driven by deceased. Clifford Beardall and Ernest L.
ll·olt were riding in one of the first, if not the first car,
to arrive at the s·cene of the ·accident from the north.
It is clear that those of the foregoing mentioned who
actually saw th.e accident observed deeeased p·roeeeding
south near the west edge of the high,vay, and his attempted turn to the left immediately in front of defendants'
truck as it was a;bout to pass. In quoting testimony, we
have referred to the pages as numbered by the eourt
reporter.
CL·AUDIUS E. STEVEN·SO·N, driver of the p~as
senger 'Car immediately following the blue Plymouth
driven by deeeased, testified that he followed the PlyInouth from the intersection at ·S·eventh East and U. S·.
Highway 91 to the scene of the accident CTr. 380-1).
Because his attention was momentarily attracted to the
three people above mentioned who were walking on the
side of the road, he did not see the· actual imp~act. However he testified that defendant's truck p·assed him just
'before the accident; that he observed deceased's. car
75 to 100 yards ahead of him just before the imp·aet;

9
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tha:t immediately after the impact, he observed defendant's truck and traile~r sliding across the highway to the
east and observed that the Plymouth had disappeared
from its former position, later identifying it on the east
side of the road as the, ear involved in the wreck. He saw
no nortllhound cars whatsoe'Ver. We quote:

'' Q. 'Could you estimate the dista~ce that this
ear was ahead of you~
A. I tried to keep~ you behind the car because of
conditions on the road, and I tried to keep,
oh, seventy-five yards to a hundred yards
behind him.
Q. Which lane of traff~c were you traveling in~
A.

Q.
A.

I tWas, as close to the shoulder as I dared to
get. The snow was piled quite high, and I was
in the section that was fairly well worn, about
three feet away from the pile of snow out
there.
What lane of traffic was this ~car ('Tuttle car)
which was proceeding you traveling in~
In the same tan e.

Q. .About how fast were you going as you went
along~'

A.

Thirty to thiry-five miles an hour.

Q. When you got near the vicinity of Lou's
Ptace, did anything unusual occur~

* * * *
A.

I rwas attracted by the honking of a horn.

Q. Where was tha;t honking coming

from~

381)
A.

From 'behind me.

10
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(Tr.

Q.

And did you see the kind of vehiele that ap-proached you at th·at time~
. l\.. I was. overtaken by a large tr~ck.

* * * *
A.

As he passed me the hack of the truck wa:s
throwing Ui>l a rolling cloud of snow. Almost
blinded me.
Q. Go ahead.
A. W eli, when the snow started to elear I could
see some peop;le walking on the side of the
road.
Q. Which side of the road was that~
That ·would he on the west side of the· road,
and my attention was attracted to them hecause I was pretty elose to them, pretty clos.e
to the snoiWhank, and I looked up and sarw thls
truck starting to slide.
Q. Which way wa:s the truck sliding~
A. It started to slide down the highway and
· gradually turned, the whole truck, and the cab
part of the truck and trailer started to turn
side\.vays across the road with a sliding motion across the highway to the east.

A.

Q.

Did you see the truck come to a

sto~p

over

there~

A.

Yes. (Tr. 282)

Q.

At the· time you noti~ced the truck, or just
prior to that time, did you see the lights of
any northbound traffic~

A.

Not that I recall.
* * * *
Were there any other cars around there at

Q.

11
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A.
Q.

Q.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.

that time, besides your car and the two vehicles that had been in this collision~
Not that I saw. {Tr. 383).
Now I show you what has been marked Defendant's Exhi1bit "3."
From IWlrat you sarw do you know whether or
not the ear which you were fo'llowing was the
car which was involved in the accident (Tr.
384)· rwith the trU[ck~
At the time I assumed-All my conclusions
were that that was the car, because I didn't
see it ·any further.
jThat eonclusion was based on what you saw~
~That is right.
At that time~
At tltat time.
I show you p~laintiff's Exhibit "B," shorwing an automobile and ask you if you recognize that photograph~ (Handing to witness.)
Yes.
And what is the car that appears in that
photograph~

A.

·That ap~parently is a !P~cture of the car that
was. involved. (Tt. 385);

* * * *
Q.

Did any other cars ever get between that car
* CTuttie 'Car) and your car from the time you
followed it until the· accident ocpurred ~

A.

No. 'There was very little; p~assing heing done
that night, and no one came in between us.
{Tr. 411)'

Q.

Did you see anyone around either of those

1'2
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vehi·cles p.rior to the time th·at you got out of
your car'
A. I g·ot out of my car just as the first peo~ple
started to ap~proach. ('Tr. 412.) ''
(Insertions in p·arentheses ours)
Mr. and Mrs. McPhie and Mr. R:o~berts exp~lained
that at the time of the accident they were walking along
the west shoulder near the snow bulk, returning from
Lou's Place to the MeP·hie's residence a short distance
south, 'both places being on the west side of the highway.
MRS. ~cPHIE testified:
'' Q. And rwhere were you ·when the-when your
attention was first attracted to either of these
vehicles~·

A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Just a little north of our home on the highway. (Tr. 329)
What were you doing at that time~
We we·re walking south to,vard our home.
Who was with you~
Mr. Elmer Roberts, my hus'band and myself.
Now w'hieh side of the highway were you on~
We were on the west side.
Was there a snowbank on either side of the
. hway ~·..
h1g
Yes, there was.
Where were you walking, with reference to
this snowbank~
Well, close to the snow!bank as possibJe.
Did anything occur about the time that you
were there whieh directed your attention to
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A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.

either of the vehi,cles involved in the accident~
Well, we he'ard a sounding of a horn.
And then what did you do~
Well, I turned to see if it was honking at us.
What did you see when you turned around~
It was p~assing a car about. opp!osite of Lou's .
. ]jt. was a truck honking.
And did you see any ·other ·cars. at about that
time~

A. Yes, there was one p~assing us about that time.
Q. And in whieh lane were these two ,cars traveling~'

A.

The two cars were on the west lane furtherest
west.
Q. Which iane was the truck traveling in~
A. S:eemed to he on the inside west lane.
Q. Tell the jury in your own words just what
happ~ened.

A.

Well, we turned to see if it was honking at us,
and it rwasn 't (Tr. 3'30) so we p~roceeded on
south, 'and the ear 1passing us at that time was
slorwing down and our attention-my 'attention seemed to go on it heeause I thought perhap~s it might he stoptpfing at my home, and a
truck ~passed and it continue'd to sound its
horn, and just a little beyond my home the car
turned directly in front of the truck, and they
seemed to throw up some snorw then and go
to the southeast side of the road, or to the
east side, would he traveling southeast, and
came to a stop· there.
Q. Then what did you do~
A.· Well, I ·went directly to the scene of the acci1
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Q.

A.
Q.

A.

Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

Q.

dent and my hus~band went in my home-in
our home to ·call the police. ('Tr. 33:1)
At the time you observed the two vehicles
come together, did you see whether or not
there were any other cars coming from the
south at that time and traveling north~
No, there wasn't any that I oibs.erved. ('Tr.
333.)
With reference to your home, aihout rwheTe
:were you standing a.t the time this hap,pened ~
Well, it would he afbout a fourth of the way
to Lou's, or half way between a road that
takes.-that goes west off from the highway,
between a road that-there is a road that goes
west between our place and Lou's, and we
were standin·g be·tween the road and our home,
about half way.
Now did you observe this car wh~ch was farther south just before the impa:ct, as. to
whether or not any signals were made of any
kind to indicate an intention to turn~
No, I ·didn't see any. Just slowing.
Did you see any stop~lights c:ome on~
No. (Tr. 334)
And how far did the lead car travel after it
hegan to turn until the point of impact, if
you have a judgment~
Well, when the truck wa:s about twenty or
twenty-five feet in back of it it turned suddenly in front of the truc.k. ('Tr. 350)
But I thought you said it turned out to t'he
right~

A.

It had been turning to the right going rather
slow.
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Q. I see. And horw far from the point of impact
did the ear begin to turn to the· right~
A. Oh, mayhe thirty-five or forty feet.
Q. About thirty~five or forty feet from the point
of imp~act; is that right~·
A. Yes. ~bout in front of my home.
Q. All right. You say it wouid he about the
width of this room then~
A. Yes, or just a little more. CTr. 351) "
J·O·HN MARTIN McPHIE testified :

'' Q.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Now I eall your attention again to that night.
Where were you when you first hecame aware
there was-first put on notice that something
unusual was going to happen, or was happenin·g at that time~ (:T'r. 356)
Well, we was ·aibout halfway between my
place and a little crossing, crossroad there,
not a crossroad but a lane there.
When you say ''·we·,'' who was with you~
Mr. Roherts. an·d my wife and mys.elf.
Now did you hear anything unusual at that
o.?'
.
t nne.
Yes, the sounding of a horn.
Where did that sound come from~
Right around Lou's Place. Right close to
L:au 's little ·cabaret out there. Beer joint.
Lou's Place is north of your p~l~ce~
Yes.
What :did you do when you heard this sounding of the horn~ S-ay what you did.
WeN, I just e·dged over.
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Q. Edged over where~
A. Towards the hank of the snowbank.
Q. Did you see what vehicle ~\Vas sounding this
horn~·

A. Yes, it was a truck.
Q. Where was the truck at that time~
A. Just coming up by Lou's, from Lou's Place
towards-going south.
Q. What direction was the truck going in at that
. e.OJ
tim
A. Going south.
Q. Did you observe any other vehi·cles at that
time~

A.

Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Yes. There was-He was passing one and
there was one passing us at this-just passing
us at that time.
How many vehrcles did you see altogether at
that time in that vicinity~ (Tr. 3:5·6.)
A truck and :two cars.
Can you tell us in whlch lane the two cars
were traveling when you o!bserved them,.
They rwere bo~h in the outside lane.
'Could you see where the truck was coming~
Yes.
·Can you tell us about where the t~bk was
from the west edge of the -concrete driving
surface~

A.

On the west lane. Second l·ane over.

Q.

After you edged over to the snowbank, then
rwhat did you do~

A.

I noticed anothe·r car I thought was going to
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stop at my house, my place. Instead of that
· he went up a little further and made a turn.
Q. Where wa.s the truck when he made that turn~
A. He was ~aihout even with us, a little past us,
and the other ('T·r. B57) car was hy us at that
time.
Q. Te'll the Jury in your orwn words what you
saw at that time.
. It just prulle·d over in front of the truck and
the tru·ek eollided with him. The other car
(second or last car) ( exp~lanation in parentheses ours) pulled up' hy my p~lace and
stopped just a little· 'beyond my tpllajce on the
o:ther side of the driveway.
Q. Wh'at ~appened after that~
A. Right around Lou's Place.
A. I broke and run for the phone. ('Tr. 358)
Q. Did you oibserve whether or npt this front car,
or the car farther south, gave any indications
of his intention to make a turn~A. Never give no signals. at all. ('Tr. 359)
Q. Well, about horw far off the hard surface did
he drive to the right~
A. From my place, right afbout in here is where
he made that turn.
Q. How far to the right of the hard surface did
he drive~·
A. Just off to the cement there is aibout all. fTr.
3'64)
Q. Was the truck about on the center of the
highway when you claimed the impact oceurre:d~

A.

Near as I could tell, yes. Passing a car.
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Q.

·so

part of the tru·ck was oveT on the e'ast

side~·

A. I wouldn't say that, no. ('Tr. 36·5)
Q.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
A.

I see, and you heard the truck honkin·g hack
here in Lou's vicinity~ (indicating).
Whether it was north or not you don't lmow~
I lmow where it-It was comin·g from the
north.
You ·don't lmo'v how far north of Lou's~
Right around Lou's Plooe-.
Could it have bee-n north of Lou's Place~
A little. Not much.
And from that time on, 'v'hile that car was
traveling almost a thousand feet, it had its
horn constantly down~ (;Tr. 369)
That's right.
Didn't it~
Yes.
And it didn't let up until the impact~
Until the imp act, when I went in the house.
And during tlrat time the road was. unob·structed, you say, to the east, and the truck
had ·plenty of room during all that time except
immediately !before the accident,. when you
say the ;car turned~
Yes. CTr. 370)
No ears eoming from ·Sp·ringville. From the
south. ( Tr. 371) ''
1

HEATH H. CO·RNE~T·TE testified:
'' Q. Norw at that time did you ohseTrve any vehircles. p~roceeding south ·ahead of you~
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A.

I did.

Q. And how many did you see at that
A.

time~

Well, there was two of them. The one I
and this one I rwas attemp~ting to iplas·s
were the only cars in the vicinity.

p~assed

Q. Whe·re was the vehicle whieh was nearest to
you, that is the car fartherest north, with
reference to Lou's Place, at aJbout the time
you p;assed it~
A.

Well, it was the first car north.
*'

A.

*

*

*

I flashed my lights a couple of times and blew
my horn to· let them knorw I was attempting

to

p~ass.

Q. You say you 'flashed your lights~
A.

From low heam to high beam.

Q·. And then what~
A.

And hlew my horn.

Q. And what heam did you have your lights on
when you p·assed the ear that ·was furtherest
north and nearest to you~ (Tr. 261)
A.

I had it on low ibeam.

Q. And in what lane, of traffict was that car
trave~g in~

A.

The outside lane.

Q. :Then aJbout how far was the other par south
of this first ear that you were
A.

approaching~

I would give no exact answer, but I would
say around one hundred and fifty fe.et, maybe
20
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a little further or maybe·
wouldn't lmow definite.

Q.

Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.

~a

little closer. I

• * * Mter you passed this first car, then what
did you do with respect to the portion of the
highway upon which you drove the truck~
I say after you passed this first car di·d you
stay in the same lane, or did you go into another lane?
:Stayed in the same lane.
Now 'vhat happened as you ap!p~roached this
se'Cond ear which was farther south~
Well, as I got up near him, why he made a
left-hand turn in front of me.
Now p·rior to the time that he made· this turn,
did you observe whether or not the-re were
any signals or indications made by him that
he was going to turn in front of you~ (Tr.
'262)

A. There- was not.
Q. What part of the truck and what p;art of the
car came togethe-r~ Came in contact~
A. W eli, it was albout right on the -corner of the
right-hand side- of the bumper. Kind of
diagonal.
Q. And then what happ~ened after that 1
A. Shoved. the car straight in front. It sho:ved
the car straight in front of the truck, and
knocked in the front wheels to the right out of
control.
Q. And then what did you do after that~
A. I tried to get lback in control.
Q. You tried to get-
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A. 'T'ried to get control of it.
Q. Did you eome to a stop after the irnp~act~
A. Yes, on the east side of the road. ('Tr. 263)
Q. When you observed the car turning in front
of you, were you ab~e to do anything about
stop~ing your truck or turning a:side or anything of that nature·?·
A. It 'h'ap·pened too quick. I didn't have time.
('Tr. 26:6)
Q. Do you recall whether or not there were any
northbound ~ars on the highway about the
time you attempted to ·pas.s the first ear~
A. In what location~
Q. Coming torwards you? Going north on the
1

highway~

A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

;There was not. ('Tr. 267)
When you say this ·car turned in front of you,
at the time of the imp~act was it straight across the highway or was it sideways or diagon'al?
You mean the car~
Yes.
It rwas in kind of diagona:l shrup1e. (Tr. 281)
Did you attempt to apply your brakes~
I hit the hrakes. as fast as I could. {Tr. 286)
At the time of the impact did you try to turn
to the right?
I trie:d to get stop,ped.
Did you try to turn to the right~
I tried to get stop~ped. (T:r. 302) ''

In summarizing the remaining portion of the evi-
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denc~, "~e

call the court's attention to the fact that counsel for plaintiffs produced no actual or direct evidence
that deceased was traveling north. ~rrue, through members of deceased's family and close friends and relatives,
counsel attempted to calculate time and show that deceased left Springville some five or ten minutes before
the actual time of ·collision, around 8 :20 to 8 :35 P·.M.
('Tr. 145) and that he, deceased, was intendh1g to go to
Provo to bowl. ·The collision occurred 3.7 miles north
or Springville and .9 miles south of the intersection of
Seventh East and the Highway in Provo. (T·r. 159) Horwever, even assuming deceased was intending to go to
Provo to borwl, no one could possibly calculate what was
actually in deceased's mind when he left Springville,
much less what ran through his mind thereafter. He had
never bowled before (Tr. 162), had never taken any interest in it and it rwasn't shown that he even knew where
to go. (Tr.l61) His wife, lVIarcella, was going to a basketball game in Sp ringville and he evidentally had some
change in plans or intention after leaving home. While
one or two witnesses said they had seen a northbound car
some distance from ~he point of collision, there was no
evidence that any such car, if there was one, was involved
in the collision. No one testified that they saw any northbound car at the time and immediate scene of the ~rei
dent, which was involved therein. c~ounsel also attempted,
through Beardall and Holt, to prove that their car was
the first to arrive at the s-cene of the accident 'and, therefore, that the Stevenson car was not the first to arrive.
This contention, obviously aimed to confuse the jury, at
1
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most 'Created a dis-pute as. to .which of the two cars mentioned arrived first. There was never any actual evidence or P'roof that deeeased was travelirrg northbound.

CAR.OL EL:LiiS:, o~cupant of the Stevenson automobile, was admittedly a regular elient of p~aintiffs' attorneys. ( Tr. 93) She testified the ear she was riding in
came to a stop on the west side of the highway. Her
efforts were princip~lly directed toward claiming that
the car immediately ahead of them was not involved in
the ac;cident. She attemp,ted to so infer hy testifying that
after stopping she observed another car ·parked on the
east side of the highway. ('Tr. 82) To the contrary, however, she :deseribed how the truck passed the car she was
in, {'Tr. 79) how the ·electric wires came down directly
in front of them, ('Tr. 81, 88, 89) acknowledged that she
did not see the actual collision, ('TT. 80) admitted there
wa:s a car immediately ahead of the one in which she was
riding tra~eling in the same direction. At the time of the
accident it is elear she was of the opinion that the ear
immediately ahead of her wa:s the one involved in the
accident, and was of the same op,inion for two or three
days thereafter. ('Tr. 96·-97, 92) Prior to the accident
she had ohserved the taillights of the ¢a:r ahead. Such
taillights were gone after the i:rrupia~t. ( Tr. 87) We quote
a portion of her testimony:
'' Q.
A.

And then what happened, Mrs.

Ellis~

We ·Were driving .along in the ear and a truck
passe·d us., and he was on the left side of us,
out in the middle of the street. It passed us
and went UJP' the hill and an a.ocident occurred.
24
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Q. Did you see any other car, Mrs. Ellis~
A. We we're following a car.
Q. Where did you first see that car~
A. O·h, I think it was on the highway all the time,
in front of us as long as we were on the highway. (Tr. 79)
* * * *
Q. Did you see the im·p,act ~
A. No, I didn't SHe him hit anything. ( Tr. 80)
* * * *
Q. I see. Now what happ·ene-d after~ Just go on
and tell the ·Court and jury what hap~p~ened.
A. Well, the electric light wires came down
across the street. We drove up~ to them, and
Mr. Stevenson was undecided as to whether to
try to go underneath them or to back up·, and
we stopped. And finally lights went out and
wires came down, and he got out of the car
and I stayed in the car, and he· was gone a few
moments and came back and decided to move
his car out of the highway, so he pulled over
into the snowbank and left me, and I stayed
in the car.
Q. Which snowbank was that~
A. On the right side of the road. (Tr. 81)
Q. And when the truck passed you about how far
did it pass you to the ea:st, as it went past
you~

A. Well, he swerved all around us, and we gave
him plenty of room.
Q. And at that time you could still see the headlights of this car proceeding south in front of
you; is that right~
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A.

I don't recall looking. I was watching the
t~ck. '(Tr. 86·)

* *

* *

Q. Did you see the taillights of that car after the
truck went out of control~
A. I was watehing the truck at all times.
Q. Answer my question if you will, please.
A. No, I did wot. (Tr. 87)

* * * *
Q. Will you estimate the distance from the wires
the front of your car was when you stOlplped.
'The Stevenson car~
A. Oh, ten 'OT fifteen feet.
Q. Was there any oor in front of you at that
time~

A. I didm':t !fi)O'tice.
Q. Was there a car in back of you~
A. Sho:rtly thereafter 1a car pulled in. CTr. 89)

* * * *
Where ~were you, with respect to Lou's Piace,
when the trU:ck p~ass~ed you~
A. Well, I could see his. lights from his bright
sign. ·Close to his p~ace. One side 'O'r the
othe·r. (Tr. 91)

Q.

* * * *
Q.

How long did you have the assumption that
the ear in front of you, the car p~roce,eding
south in front of you, was the car involved
in the accident~· How long after the accident
did you eontinue to have that assumption~
A. Two or three days. CTr. 9·2)
1

* * * *
Q. ·C:an you tell us now, calling your attention
2!6
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again to th~e taillights of this car which was
proceeding south in front of your car, can you
tell us about how far south 'Of you the\ taillights of that ~ar were when you saw the~ car
last, or saw the taillights last, I'll put it that
way~ If you can give us an estimate. T~wo
hundred feet~ 'Two hun·dred ·and fifty feet~
Fifty feet~A. Two hundred to two hundred and fifty feet.
Q. Then I think you told us yesterday that you
we·re watching· the truck as it went down the·
road~

A. Yes.

Q. And then ·did you say-correct me if I'm
wrong on this-the truck seemed to be out of
control~ It went out of control~
A. Yes, I did say that.
Q.

That was after the truck ·went past

A.

That's right.

you~

Q. You didn't see the taillights of the car
ceedin·g after that, did you~

p~ro

A. Didn't see t'lvat.

Q. Did you see any other vehicle at that time,
other than the truck you saw skidding out
of control~
A.

No, I didn't notice it.

Q. You didn't see any northbound cars in that
vicinity at all, di'd you~ ( Tr. 95)
A.

Mo.

Q. Did you see the lights of any northbound veh~~les ~
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A. No.

Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

* * * *
I see. And at that time you were under the
assumption that the car you ~were following
had been involved in this accident with the
truck, were you not~
That's right.
And that was, based upon the impression you
received there that night~·
That's correct. (Tr. 96)
Just before the impact occurred do you recall
whether or not you saw any pedestrians walking .along the highway, or on the west side of
the highway~
Y~es. I believe that Mr. Stevenson was concerned about them.
Did you see them~
Yes, I did. Our headlightsHow many were there~
I think there We're two or three.'' ( Tr. 98)

The statement given lby Mrs. Ellis to the investigator
January 17th, two ·days after the accident, when the facts
were still fresh in her mind, (Tr. 99-100) re~eived in
evidence without oibjection (Tr. 102) is significant. It
('See Defe·ndant's Exhibit 14), the correction having been
duly initiated hy Mrs. Ellis at the time the statement
was taken ('Tr. 100) read as follows :
D·efendant's Exh:lbit "14"
''Provo, Utah
January 17, 1949
''My name is Carol Ellis I am ·25 years of age.
28
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:\Iy home address is 251 East 3rd :s!outh in Sp·ringYille, Utah. On J·anuary 15, 1949, I was riding in
a car driven by ~Ir. Stevenson he lives in Payson,
Utah. We were traveling south on Highway 91
\Ve were driving along at thiTty five (35) miles
an hour We were following another car at a
distance of about one hundred (100) feet. A large
truck passed us. We were in the west lane of
traffic the truck was passing in the center of the
road. the truck had been 'blowing its horn. while
it had come up hehind us. and it was hlowing its
horn when it went by us and it seemed to keep
blowing its horn after it p·assed us. After the
truck got by us the truck seemed to skid out of
control the truck throwed up a lot of
1

'C.E.When it got even with the ·other ear. ·C.E.
snow(wben j+ vren+ by ns) We di~d not see the car
and the truck actually hit. We saw the lights of
the car disap!p·ear and then we could see the car
on the other side of the truck. the truck seemed
to Jackknife and the truck also stopp~ed over on
the East side of the road. I got the imp~ression
the truck was out of control. the car had been
going along in a straight line. We had followed
it for several blocks. the a:ccident envolved the car
that was directly in front of us and the truck that
was ;passing. As far as I know there was no traffic
-corning .from the south. the first car that stop·p·ed
after we stop·ped was a ear going south that was
following us. there was also some P'eop,le walking
along ·the :voad. the sn'Ow that flew up did not
blo~k our view until the truck was up' bi)! the car
that was in front of us. the reason we were unable
to see the ear was that the rear of the tru:ck wa.s
swinging across the Hi~ghway and the rear of the
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truck was what blocked my view.
I have read this statement and it is. correct.
·C·AROL ELLIS''
The same facts were related hy Mrs. Ellis to Officer
Halladay at the scene of the accident. She was quite sure
that the ear immediately ahead was the same car that
was involved in the a~ident. (;Tr. ·229)
1

I

O·FFICER ELMO HALLADAY, of the p·rovo City
Police De,partment, investigating officer, arrived shortly
after the accident and noted the physical facts, making
the usual measurements. He identified scratch marks
south of the point of impact near or crossing the center
of the highway and indicating the ears had skidded from
the west toward the east side of the highway. These
marks were fresh as though something had slid or
dragged ajcross and could have originated from the Tuttle
car or from the defendants' truck as it swerved. To
indicate the general location of these marks the officer
wrote ''s-cratches'' on the map, Exhib~t GG. ('See T'r. 2267-8, 23.3-4, 237)

For the convenience of the court we have inserted
herein a photostatic -copy of the officer's original drawing, Exhibit 17, received in evidence, which was prepared
hy him through what he learned at the scene of the acoident, including the interviewing of witnesses and examining the scene at that time. (Tr. 2:46)
l
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It is readily observed th-at Officer Halladay was
satisfied that the accident was. caused when deceased
turned in front of the truck. There is only one feature
of the report which requires eXlp[anation. While Officer
Halladay originally marked in his report that the Tuttle
car was going south, he explained that he was later induced to strike the word ''south'' and insert the word
''north'' after talking with Mr. Beardall (a friend of the
Tuttle family). In this connection, however, Officer Halladay explained that the ~basis of his change was soley by
reason of his conversation w·ith Be1ardall (subsequent to
the accident) and that as to his own opinion he said : ''I
really won't krn;ow myself." (Tr. 2'40-241) He had not
talked with McPhies and as to his original opinion, based
''on the facts that I found at the scene of the accident
and also the witnesses that I talked to there'' (iS,tevenson,
Carol Ellis and Cornette) he wias oif the ovpirnion Tuttle
was driving south and turned in f.ront of the truck. ('Tr.
240)

Perhaps the most amusing witness during th-e trial
was the elderly gentleman, EL~MER M. RO·BE~RT~s:,
whose testimony ('Tr. 420-433) was really not worth anything either way. His ·efforts to repudiate his original
statement (Exhibit 2) ('Tr. 427-8) were on the ridiculous
side as he clearly acknowledged, hoth in his original
signed statement and in his direct testimony, that while
he was aware the truek p·assed 'CTr. 421) he didnlt s~ee the
collision. (Tr. 423.) He "was. not especially watching the
vehicles after they passed us'' (Exhibit 2) and he did
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not lmow whether ''a nortHbound or a southbound car
was involved in the pollision. '' ('Tr. 431)
In his efforts ·to dispute that the Stevenson car was
the firs:t southbound automobile to reach the scene of the
a:ecident counsel produced Clifford Beardall and Ernest
L·. Holt, associates in the slot machine business, both
former employees of the state tax -commission. Beardall,
while claimi~g his ear was first to rea;ch the scene, acknowledged he didn't ohserve the· pedestrians. ('Tr. 1301)' and that he didn't see the accident. He ,could not say
that he saw any car either northbound or southbound that
was definitely involved in the collision. This witness, a
friend and neighbor of the :Tuttle family, ( Tr. 109') at
most gave negative· testimony. We quote:
I

'·'Q. You say you saw the impact :between the two
cars~
A. I seen the collision and the lights. I didn't see
Q.

the impoot, but I heard t:he oollis~ovn..
* * * *
I me,an at the scene of the accident. Was
either vehrcle moving when you came U1p
there~

A. No sir.
Q. They had both come to a stop, hadn't they1
A. That's right. (Tr. 12·4)
* * * *
Q. Mr. Beardall, wasn't the flashing of these
wires the first thing that called your attention
to the acicident ~
A. Yes sir. That isn't what you asked a second
ago.
* * * *
32
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Q. ..A.t the time you heard the impact you sruw
neither of the two vehicles involved skidding
from the west side to the east side of the
highway, did you~
A. I didn't see any skidding across, no. {Tr. 12'5)
* * * *
Q. And at that time you didn't see any lights of
northbound vehicles when you arri~ed at the
scene, or just before the accident occurrHd,
did you.¥
A. I couldn't see the lights due to the obstruction.
Q. l . .ou didn't see any?
A. No." (Tr. 131)
The s·ame can be said of ERNEST L. HO·UT. He
testified:
"Q. And if there were pedestrians walking just
west of the concrete edge, and just to the east
of the snowbank, along the side of it, you
didn't see them~
A. No.
Q. You didn't see the two vehicles come together,
did you~
A. No.
Q. And when you saw the truck and the car they
w.ere both stopped over on the east side of the
highway, weren't they~
A. Yes.
Q. Your first intimation of the aecident was
when you saw these wires sputtering~
A. That':s right." ('Tr. 140)
The other witnesses call·ed by plaintiff, wh9se testi33:
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mony we have not quoted, -clearly did not see the accident
and could not have known of any knowledge what car
was involved nor in which direction it was tra~eling.
Charles M. RobeTts was three-fourths of a mile north
of the accident. ('Tr. 2·5) The only knowledge he had was
of the P. I. E. truck passing him, the snow covering his
windshield so he had to get out and wip·e the windshield
in order to pontinue. He further said, "When I got out
there the condition was there. ;That's all I know about
that." ( Tr. 26)
D'Ouglas A. Payne saw the truck pass when he was
aJhout one and one-half blocks north of where the accident
occurred. ( TT. 35)
Dellis Elliott was about a block north of Lou's Place,
('Tr. 43) saw the truck pass but didn't ohserve the truck
after it passed Lou's Place. ('Tr. 46)
Jean Elliott, mother of Dellis, was standing on her
porch some distance north of the aecident and saw the
truck p·ass. (T'r. 54) Clearly she did not see the accident
nor what pja.ssenger car was involved.
Gordon Elliott observed the truck pass and turned
his back. ('Tr. 57) He didn't see the accident. (Tr. 66)
o~ther witnesses called were not near the scene of the
accident when it occurred.
(A)

THE COLLISIO·N WAS. P'ROXIMATELY
~CAUS·E·D· Q:R PROXIMATEL.Y CO:N'TBIBU:TED ·TO
BE BY DE'CEAS.ED' S· OWN NE·GLIGENCE.
1

In summarizing all of the evidence, we do not overlook the fact that plaintiffs claim that defendants' truck
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was traYeling slightly in excess of 50 m.p.h. in a ·50 mile
zone, although the evidence varied from 40 ·or 45 m.p·.h.
to a possible ma:xin1um of 55. On the other hand, eye
witnesses '\Yithout question, observed the aecident and
sa"~ deceased's Ply1nouth as it passed them and saw him
suddenly and une:xpeetedly turn in front of defendants'
truck. Speed under such circumstances does not constitute the proximate cause. See Cederlof v. Whited, 110
Utah 45, 169 Pac. (2d) 777.
Plaintiffs's sole claim or basis of liability was the
contention that deceased was traveling north upon the
highway and, therefore, did not turn left in front of defendants' truck. No claim of liability was made in the
later event, as the authorities are .clear that contributory
negligence existed either as a sole cause or at least a
proximately -contributing cause.
In TT:errill v. Rarrington, (Me.) 163 Atlantic 266·, both
cars were traveling alon·g a three laned highway on the
outskirts of a town. Defendant, who was driving the rear
car turned left into the center lane and blew her horn to
indicate that she intended to pass. Be.fore turning left,
the plaintirf, in the lead car looked in the rear vievv
mirror and saw ears in the distance but did not see defendant's car in the middle lane. Plaintiff made a signal
and started to turn left. Defendant applied her hrakes
and threw her car to the left but still ran into plaintiff.
A verdict was returned for the plaintiff. Defendant
entered a motion for a new trial with the state Sup~reme
Court. The court granted the motion holding as a matter
of law that .plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate
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~ause

of the .accident. In so holding, they said:
''It is familiar law that the operator of a
motor vehicle intending to cross the highway in
front of a car coming from the opposite direction
on its own right of way must give notice of the
intention to eross in order to charge the driver of
the other car with negligence· in pursuing its
eourse. The law charges the driver of the car making such a -crossing with the duty of so watching
and timing the movements of the other car as
to reasonably insure himself of a safe passage
either in stoprp~ing and waiting if necessary.
'(Maine cases -cited). No less strict rule can be
app1lied to operators attempting to cross the right
of way of caTs coming from behind. ReasonaJbJe
care must he exercised in ascertaining their presence· in the ·passing lane. The precautions above
stated must then be taken.
''·The argument of ~counsel, as we understand
it, is that, when Mrs. V errilllooked i:q. her mirror
just before she turned, the Harrington car was
one of those following hehind several hundred
feet, and so great was its subsequent speed that
it tr:aveled that distance and reached the point of
eollision with the Verrill car, going at the rate of
15 miles an hour, went diagonally across 20 feet
of cement in little, if any, more than a second of
time. 'The mechanical p~erfection of automobiles
of today has not yet produced such s~peed. A
reasonable interp~retation of the evidence pJaces
the Harrington car close up to the Verrill car as
the latter made its turn. Th·ey were traveling
the main trUnk line highway and not in the comp~act or huilt up section of town. There weTe no
cars. ap~proaching from the op~posite direction, and
as already stated, the conduct of the driver of the
car ahead indicated to Mrs. Harrington that two
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lanes w·ere and ""'"ould continue to he open and unobstructed. Under the circumstances there is no
credible evidence that she \Vas driving a:t excessive
speed .,vhen she started to pass or thereafter
failed to exer;cise the care which eould he reasonably expected of a person confronted with the
turn of a car directly in front of him, ciea.ting an
emergency requiring the quickest of judgment and
instant action.
''We are convinced that the weight of the evide~~e clearly indicates that the negligence of the
defendant M·attie c. Verrill was the sole p•roximate cause of this accident. The verdi·cts in all
these cases are based on a finding directly to
the contrary. They are manifestly wrong and
must ibe set aside. In each case, a ne·w trial is
granted and the entry is
Motion

~Sustained.''

In Probst
v. Smith Hard!IJ)Iare Co., (Lia.) 141 So. 508,
I
the plaintiffs were in a sedan ·driving along the highway. Defendant's truck was following. The driver of
the truck sounded his horn and turned out to the left to
pass when the plaintiff suddenly signalled for a left turn
and turned in front of the truck, which crashed into the
Plaintiff's car. From a judgment for the p·laintiff, the
defendant ap~p·ealed. The ruppellate court set aside the
judgment and rej·e.cted the plaintiff's demands, saying:
"Here the testimony of Silver and Daniels
shows that the sedan made an a:brup~t, unexp;eeted,
and sudden turn to its left directly into the p~ath
way of the truck, and ·even if Probst gave the
proper signal, as it is stated hy him and the others
who were in his car, the turn wa.s so rash and so
37
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sudden that the defendant cannot he held to have
·he en negligent.''
'See also: LriJt:herbury v. Kimmet, (Cal.) 195 Pac. 660,
Y ourng v. ·Cerrtato, ('Cal.) 37 P 2d. 1063; Madron v. McCoy
et al., (Idaho) 126 P 2d. 56,6; Dudley v. Surles, (L·a.) 11
·so. 2nd. 70.
·(Br F AIL·URE

TO PRO:VE ALLEGATIO·NS
AND D·IRE·CTrON OF TRAVEL.
We ask specifically W'hat evi-dence est,ab·liAshes that
deceased w1as g'oing nort.h up1on the highw·ay? True,
counsel attempted to -confuse the matter by offering
testimony of friends and members of deceased's family
that deceased left !Stpringville about 8 :2·5 P.M. to go to
Provo to 'howl. He also atte~1ted to confuse, through
Beardall and Holt which J~ar, Beardall's or Stevenson's,
arrived first at the S'cene of the aooident. These matters
do not establish the actual direetion of deceas.ed '·s travel.
They are necessarily of such a nature that after the
lapse of several months following an accident, people
sometimes naturally differ, and are wot of such a character .as to prove itn fact how am;d in w·hat manner the
·accidevnt occur·red. Dis in t~rested eye witnesses standing
beside the road s:ruw the accident. Their testimony corroborated hy physical facts is heyond reasonable doubt.
In face of the actual evidence, the~e was a total
lack of piroof of the allegations of the Complaint that
deceased was travelling north, and consequently a failure
to sustain the burden of piroving a cause of action.

('C)

FAILURE

P R0 VE

TO

1

PROXIMATE

c.AUSE·.
Even if it were assumed tha;t deeeas-ed was travelling
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north, "\Ye ask what e-vid~ence est~ablishes an.y p roxima.t·e
'oause? Isn't it true plaintiffs' theory rests in speculati'On and conjecturef
1

In Tremelling v. Southern Pacific Co., 51 Utah 189,
170 Pac. 80, 'this. court placed particular em·phasis upon
the fact that the verdict should not be base·d upon sp~ec
ulative evidence, and wh:ere the evidence was -conjectural
and speculative as to the ~proximate cause of de:ceased's
death the verdict in plaintiff's favor was reversed. The
court, in the following langultge, furth·er pointed out
that inferences must not be hased upon assumed or
supposed facts :

'' * * * Where, however, as in this case, the
inference is ibas.ed upon an assumed or sup~posed
fact, which fact the evidence shows did not exist,
then the inference is left without sup~port. The
rule in that regard is stated hy th-e Sup~reme
Court of Oregon in the case of Goss v. Northern
Pac. Ry. 'Co., 48 Or. 439, 87 p·ac. 149·, in the
headnote, thus :
'' 'Where the evidence of negligen~e is entirely inferenti·al, and the testimony for the defendant is clear and undisputed to the effect
that there was no negligence, the p~laintiff's· case
is overcome as a matter of law, and it becomes
the duty of the judge to take the case from the·
jury.' ''
Plaintiffs take comfort in relying upon a presumption that deceased was in the exercise of due care. However, this rule does wot relieve p~ailntiffs of the duty or
burden to p1rove proximate cause-facts upon which
lvability oam be based.
39
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Furthermore, this court in several de~isions has
I
wisely determined that legal rights should he judicially
determined upon evidence where the facts can 'be so
established, and that where there is actual evidence the
oase must be decided upon the evidence wnd any presump~t~on of d/ue care must then not be aonsideKed.
In Re Newell's Estate, 78 Ut:ah 46:3, 5 Pac. (2d)
230, it was said:
"When, however, the facts and circumstances
wer-e shown concerning which the presumption
was indulged, the presumption ceased and the
controversy was to be decided upon the evidence
adduced independently of the presumption.''
('Citing cases, including State v. Green, 78 Utah
·580, 6 Pac. ('2d) 177)."
And in ·Saltas v . .Affleck (Utah), 102 Pac. (2d) 493,
it was. said :
''And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is
that a.s soon .as evidence is offered, 0n the question, the presum·ption ceases and does not longer
exist.''
1

:Similarly, a p·resumption of negligence has·ed on
the fact that a collision mary have o~curred on defendant's wrong side of the highway (which it did not in the
instant case) is comp~letely rebutted by ·evidence showing
the collision was p•roxirnately eaused hy reason of other
causes. See, L·arkey v. Chur-ch (Okla.), 192. Pae. 569;
Kennedy v. (~pldenweyer (L:a.), 12:1 So. 636 and Bragdon
v. Kellogg '(Maine), 105 Atl. 433.
In the· latter case the court said :
''Do the law and the evidence rebut the pre-
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sumption against the defendant in this
think they do.''

case~

We

Another reason 'vhy plaintiffs have failed to prove
facts su:tncient to constitute a cause- of action i'B that if
it be assumed that deceased were travelling north, the
evidence sho"~s the collision took place just west of, or
at hest straddled, the center line. Deceased's Plymouth
was struck broadside (see Exhibits. 3 and 4), which of
necessity showed it to lbe partly, if not entirely, on its
wrong side of the road. So even if it he assumed that
deceased was travelling north, facts are not p~roven
estaJblishing liability.
Another well established principle is that the burden
of proof cannot be sustained by plaintiff hy p~redicating
inferences on assumed facts. ·That is to say the burden
of proof is not sustained hy plaintiff where it is n·e~es'
sary to base inference upon inference to reach the ultimate conclusion.
Utah Foundry & Machine 'Co. v. Utah Gas &
Coke ·Co., 42 Utah '533., 131 Pruc. 1173.;
Karren v. Bair, 63 Utah 344, 22·5 P·ac. 1094;
Prentice p:a;cking & Storage ·Co. v. United
Pacific Ins. Co. (Wash.), 106 Pac. (2'd) 3'14;
Goodloe v. Jo-Mar Dairies .Co. ('Kan.), 185
Pac. (2d) 158.
The jury should not be permitted to infer or sp~ec
ulate that deceased was travelling north; further infer
that he was proceeding in the exe~cise of reasonable
care when there were eye witnesses to the contrary and
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also infer that facts existed establishing liability without
actual !Piroof.
We respectfully submit t~at defendants' motions for
a directed verdict duly made lbef.ore and after verdict
should have been sustained.

(2) ERRO·RJS IN INSTRU'C'TING T'HE JURY
:The eourt in instructing the jury in effect gav;e
plaintiffs' requested instructions and ·practically none
requested :by defendants. The instructions given were
erroneous in several substantial purticulars. For the
most p~art, those given were mere abstract statements
of law without any app,lication to the facts' and evidence
of the case.
A. IN'STRUCT~[ONS IMIP'RO·PERLY DEFINING
D·U·TIE'S OF' DEFENDAN·T.
When instructions are given to the jury defining
the legal du.ties of defendant whieh place a greater duty
than the law requires, then such instructions are necessarily prejudicial to defendant's. rights and a new trial
should fbe granted to afford defendant a fair trial on the
issues of lh1hility. · The instructions hereinafter referred
to were induced and given at the specific request of
counsel for the plaintiffs and sp,ecific e.xce:ptions were
duly t1aken by the d:efense i(:Tr. 461-73).
(a) The court's Instruction No. 13 (Tr. 2,3-3, duly
excepted to, Tr. 466), defining the duties of defendant
with respect to lookout, among other things said: "Included in this duty to use due care and diligence is the
duty to cowstarntly keep 'a ~ookovwt wo't only ahead, but ~o
42
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the sides of hi.s
plained of:

ve~i.cle.''

CO~URT·',S

We quote the

p~aragr~h.

com-

INSTRUCTIO·N No. 13

''You are instructed that it is the duty of a
driver of a motor vehicle upon the p·uhlic highways of this ·state to at all times exercise due
~re and diligence in order to p·revent injury to
persons or property lawfully upon the highway.
I ncltuded in this duty to use due care and diligence
is the duty to CO"YYJStamtly keep: a zo,okout not on:ly
ahead, but to the sides of his vehicle, and to
actually see, as well as to look for, all p~ers.ons,
objects and things which are reasonably within
the range of his vision, and whieh may 0onstitute
a hazard. It is then his further duty after having
seen, or after he should have seen, to use such
-care and diligence as a reasonable and prudent
person, having due re:gard to all conditions. of
the highway, the presence of intersections, obstructions or any other ~ondition which may
produce a hazard; would use to p~revent injury.
And in the event that a driver fails or negleets
at any time to exercise such reasonaJble care and
diligence, he is negligent. And if, as a proximate
ff"esult of such negligewce, injury or ·wamage iJs
oaused to any yPBrson, the driver so causing the
injwry or damage is l~able tD the p1erson thus
injured fior ~all d)am,ag es sustained by reas-on of
such negligewce, unless such p-erson is himself
negligent and his negligence proximately contributes to ·produce the injury.'' (Tr. 233)
This ·Court, in reve:rsing the ~ase for a new trial in
Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151~ 140 Pac. C2d) 772., at
page 160 of the Utah R.eport, said:
"In Instructions Nos. 15 and 21, the· court
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told the jury that it was the duty of each driver
to keep· a const(JJYI;t lookout and that if either failed
to do so he would he negligent. The law requires
a motorist to maintain a reasonably careful lookout so as to avoid a eollision with p ersons or
dbjeets on the highway. 5· Am. Jur. 5,g~9, Sec. 167;
Cunnien v. Superior Iron Works Co., et al., 17'5
Wis. 172, 184 N.W. 7·67, 18 A.L.R. 667; Boooalero
v. Wadleigh, 113. ·Cal. Ap·p. 376, 298 P. 52.6. What
constitutes a reasonably -careful lookout varies
with the varying circumstances, and it is for the
jury to determine whether or not a person maintained such a lookout under all of the facts as
shown by the evidence. It may well be that,under
-certain -circumstances a 'constant' lookout would
be required and any lookout less than that would
constitute a lack of due care. From the evidence
in this cas.e it -cannot he said that reasonruble minds
would reach only one conclusion, that is, that
the exercise of reasonable care under the circumtances would require a 'constant' lookout. The
court erred in instructing the jury that a 'constiant' bookout w~ould be re:quired. ''
1

In Azzaro v. O·'Connell ( C·al.), 9 P'ae. (2d) 345, it
was held reversible error to instru-ct the jury that there
was a duty on the part of a p:edestrian to he consfxllrlttly
on the alert for vehicles app-roaching. Said the court:
1

"We conclude that the giving of this instru,Ction was error, because it was an incorrect statement of the legal duty of the appellant and of the
de-ceased.''
In Neidig v. Fisher ·(M.H.), 8 Atl. (2d) 564, a finding of the jury for v~aintiff was sustained, notwithstanding he failed to keep, a eonstant lookout for an approach44
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1ng auto1no'bile. The court pointed out that due care
might require him to make obseTvation momentarily in
some other direction, and, furthermore, ''this failure· to
constantly observe is not itself controlling, hut is only
an element to be considered with other testimony in
the case.''
In Kaiser Co., Inc. v. American Individual Laundry
Co. (Pa.), 10 .Atl. (2d) 64, it was held plaintiff in p.ro~
ceeding into an intersection, although the disfavored
driver, under the right of way rule, was not negligent
as a matter of law in not keeping a con.stJant loolrout in
defendant's direction.
:s:ee, also, Prato v. Snyder (Cal.), 55 Pac. (2d) 255.
The court's Instruction No. 13 was p·articularly
prejudicial not only in stating that defendant was required to ''constantly keep a lookout'' hut even went
further and required defendant to keep a constan.t lookout i1~ every direction, ''not onl/y ahead, bwt t1o the sides
of his vehicle.'' It was further improper in that it permitte-d the jury to find that defendant wa;s negligent in
not keeping a lookout, when the only evidence was that
he was keeping a loo kout, and, in the absence of evidence
to the eontrary, he is presumed to have kept a lookout.
1

In Azarro v. O'Connell ('Cal.), 9 Pac. (2d) 345, it
was held reversible error to instruct U!pon the issue of
contrihutory negligence as to lookout, where there was
no evidence of failure to look to overcome ·a p~resumption
of due care.
See, also:
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'Tyng v. Constant-Lorain·e Investment Company, 37 Utah 304, 108 Pac. 1109, at p.
1'111;
State· Bank of Beaver ~County v. Hollingshead,
82 Utah 416, 25 Pac. ( 2d) 612, at p. 618;
Woodward v. S1)ring Canyon ~Coal Company,
90 Utah 578, 63 Pac. (2d) 2'67, at p. 273.
(B) T·HE C·OURT'S INS'T·RU~CTIONS NUMBE&ED 14 (Tr. 234} AND, 15 (Tr. 23'5) WERE SIMILARLY
ERRONE·OUS IN REQUIRING DEFENDANT' :TO
EXERCISE A GREATER DE·GRE·E .O·F CARE THAN
'THE. LAW REQ·ffiRES.
The court instructed, No. 14:
''You are instructed that jn addition to the
duty to keep a prop~er lookout, a driver m~tSt at
all times maintain such control over his automoibile and must take such measures as are reasonable to stop or turn tro avoid a coUision with
another vehicle or person urpon the highw ay reasonably within t:he nang-e of his vision. And in
the event suc.h drivBr frails or neglects to s:a keep
his vehicle 11J'nder !COntrol as set forth rab'OVe, he is
negligent. And where such negligence proximately causes injury or damage to any other person
or p~rotperty, the driver of such vehicle is liable
for all resulting d:amage, unless such person is
himself guilty of negligence whieh proximately
contributes to produce the injury.'' CTr. 234)
1

The foregoing effectually told the jury that defendant was required to drive so that he could avoid colliding with any one. This typ~e of instruction was condemn46
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ed and the case reversed in :swtas v. A.ffle:clk, g,g Utah
381, 105 Pac. (2d) 17·6. We quote:
·
''Appellant assigns as error the giving by
the court of instruction numbered 11, and p·articularly that P'art which reads as follows: 'In
this case it was the duty of the defendant Kenneth Butte to drive his automobile on said highway, using reasonable care and p·rudence so tha.t
he could avoid injuring anyone or colliding with
any person on the highway.'
''·The instruction if followed p~r•actically instructed the jury that the defendant in addition
to keeping a p~rop~er lookout and requiring the
exercise of ordinary care and pTuden,ce having
in consideration due vigilance commensurate with
the circumstances and surroundings required him
to use such care and prudence so that he could
avoid colliding with anyone, regardless of whether,
such one were or were not guilty of negligence.
"'That part of the inS'trnction failed to take
into ~onsideration the right of defendant to
assume that all other !Persons up·on the highway
would use ordinary care and reasona;hle precaution for their own own safety until the contrary ap~peared.''
Cnunsel for plaintiff acknowledged the error when
he requested the court to substitute the original instruction No. 14 by incorporating the word ·''reasonable·.''
However, the use of the word ''reasonaJble'' does not
cure the harmful effect of the instruction, as we call
attention to the statute from which the ins~truction was
apparently derived, namely, Sec. 57-7-113 U.C.A. 1943,
which reads:
"In every event sp,eed shall be so controlled
47
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

as may he necessary to avoid ,colliding with any
p~erson, vehicle or other -conveyance on or entering the hrighrwi(J.1J in comp,l/i)(J)'Y/)ce with legal requirements OJnd the druty of all p.e;rsons to use due
care.''
Just as this ·Court pointed out in the ·Saltas case,
supra, the instruction fails to taJke into consideration
the right of defendant to assume that all other persons
upon the highway will use ordinary care and reasonable
precaution for his. own safety until the contrary appears.
The error existing in the court's instruction No. 14,
is re-emp1hasized hy the court's instruction No. 15 ('Tr.
235), the first paragraph of wh~ch reads:
''·You are instructed that it is further provided hy law that no p·erson shall drive a vehicle
on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable .and p·rudent under the conditions and havi~g
regard to the actual and potential hazards then
existing. In every evewt, .sp,e.ed shall b·e so C'On-brolled, by using dJue o.are {}j}'/;d caution, so as to
prevent or (JJV·oid colliding with any P'er~'orn, ve:hficle
or other oonveywnce orv or entering .the highway."
(Tr. 2'35)
It is significant that instruction No. 15 entirely
eliminated that qualification of the statute which reads:
"entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due ~re.''

('C)

S.P'EED' N·O'T A PRO~IMA'TE CAU.S:E.

(c:)' ·The court's instruction No. 15 was further
imp,rop.er in that there was no evidence that defendant's
48
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speed \Ya.s a. proximate eause of the collision.
See:
~C.ede.rlof v. Whited (Utah), 169 P~ac. (2d) 777;
~Stoibie v. Sullivan (Me.), 105 Atl. 714;
Whalen v. Dunbar (R.I.), 115 Atl. 718;
Burlie v. Stephens (Wash.), 193 Pac. 684;
Bain v. Fuller (Nova Scotia), 29 D.L.R. 113.
The foregoing cases hold that speed not :proven to
be a proximate cause of the collision cannot he considered.
Had there been any basis on which it could have been
a proximate ~ause which we contend there was not, defendants were at least entitled to a qualifying instruction as a guide to the jury so that the jury would not
predicate liability on sp~eed if it was not a p~roximate
cause. D·efendants' requested instructions Nos. 16 ( Tr.
213) and 17 (Tr. 214), if given, would have aided the
jury in determining the p·roximate cause. Exception
was duly taken to the court's refusal to give such requests which read as follows :
D~EFE.NDANT:S'

REQUE·S:TED No. 1'6
~'You are instructed that the p10sted sp·eed
at the time and pJace of the accident was. 50 miles
per hour. You are further instructed that the
laws of the :sa~ate of Utah do not require unqualifiedly that a driver must not eJCceed the posted
or prescribed speed hut only provide that sp.eed
in excess thereof shall be prima facie unlawful
and s~peed slightly in excess of the prescribed
limit does not necessarily constitute negligence,
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although a driver is required to drive at a speed
which is reasonable and prudent under all of the
existing conditions~. You are further instructed
that if you find from the evidence that the deceased, Dale Tuttle, just p~rior to the accident,
was driving south on or near the west edge of
the highway and suddenly and unexpeetedly made
a left turn in front of defendant's approaching
truck, under such ~ircumstances that the driver
and o:perator of defendant's truck could not reasonalhly have expected or anticip~ated that the
deceased, Dale Tuttle, was going to so turn to
the left, then the sp~eed, if any, of defendant's
truck would not he a p~roximate eause of the
collision.'' (·Tr. ·213)
D'EFENDANT:S,' REQUES,TED No. 17
''You are instructed that if you find from
the evidence that the deceased, Dale Tuttle, was
driving his Plymouth automobile south near the
west edge of the highway and that he, Tuttle,
negligently turned to the left in front of defendants' truek, and that said deceased, Dale Tuttle,
was not driving north upon the highway just prior
to the -collision, then the fact that p~art of defendants' tr11;cJk may h.ave been partially east of the
center line of the highway would not he a proximate cause of the collision." ('Tr. 214)
We resp~ectfully submit the·re was revers,ible error
in the court's instructions n11Illhered 13, 14 and 1'5, and
in the refusal of the court to give defendants' requested
instructions numJbered 16~ and 17.
(D) ERRO·R IN ALL:OWING THE JURY 'TO
PRE~S·UME DE,C EASED WAS EXERJCISING DUE
CARE.
Throughout the trial, counsel for plaintiff continued
1
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to insist that p·lainti:ff 'vas presumed to be in the exeTcise of reasonable care. This 'vas not only improp·er, hut
too much emphasis entirely 'Yas given to the so called
presumptions arnd inferences not w·arranterd by the evid.ence.
This is particularly true with resp•e:ct to the court's
Instruction No. 9 given to the jury as follows:
''You are instructed that negligence, p·roximate cause and other issues in this case may he
proved hy circumstantial evidence, as well as
direct evidence, and it is for you to judge from
all of the evidence receive:d in the ease together
with the inferences that can he fairly and reasonaJbly drawn therefrom, how the collision, in which
the decedent, Dale Tuttle, lost his. life, occurred.''
(Tr. 229)
And the court's Instruction No. 6, which, in
reads as follows :

p~art,

''~There

is a p·resumption that the deceased
used due care for his own protection and did all
that reasona!hly was required for his own safety.''
('Tr. 226)
While the portion of number 6 quoted was qualified
by the preceding words, ''In the abse·nce of evidence
to the contrary," it is highly improhaJble that the jury
would understand the significance of those words and
in all proha;hility gave some weight to the p~resump·tion
mentioned. Had the court given defendants' requested
instruction No. 19 (Tr. 216) the jury would have been
clearly instructed that any p·resump.ti.on that deceased
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w1a.s in the exercise of due oar.e could not b·e consid,ered

by them as evideYffice. or at all but that their verdict should
be btased solely on the evidewc.e.
Furthermore, had the court given the first paragraph
of defendants' requested instruction No. 7 ('Tr. 204), in
substance :cautioning the jury not to determine the
facts by speculation or guesswork, defendants would
have heen afforde;d some protection as against the
court's instruction No. 9 which p~ermitted the jury too
great a latitude to speculate and base inference upon
inference.

(E} ERROR IN SUBMITTING NUMEROUS
AND REPE TITIOU·S ALL·EGATIO·NS UNS,UPPORTE~D· BY E·VIDEN·C·E.
(d) ·The court's instruction No.1 (Tr. 219-2.1), likewise induced hy plaintiff's requested instructi:on No. 2
('Tr. 151), duly excep1ted to by defendants, simply copied
all of the allegations of plaintiff's complaint verlbatim
with respect to every alleged ground of negligence, several of which were mere re·petitions of the other, and
all of vvhich were enumerated without any regard to
whether there was actual evidence to support a :finding
of negligence or p·roximate cause based on the particular
grounds alleged. Instructions of this kind were condemned as constituting revers.ilble ·error notwithstanding
the fact that the jury was instructed that the allegations
did not constitute evidence.
1

In Shields. v. Utah Light & Traction ·Co. (Utah),
105 Pac. (2d) 347, the eourt said:
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'' * • * In setting forth the claims of the
parties to the jm·y, only that portion of the ple·adings on which evidence had been introduced,
should be mentioned at all, * * *

'• ''T

e conclude that the reading of the long
and involved con1plaint to the jury as p~art of the
charge was error not altogether corrected hy the
mere admonition that the foregoing is not to be
construed as evidence but merely sets forth the
claims of the plaintiff.

'' * * * the conclusion must he reached that
appellant's substantial rights were in fact affected
and prejudiced in a material manner.''
Plaintiff's allegations of negligence numbered (a)
to (k) in the instant :case were extremely rep~etitious as
follows:
A. D·riving in excess of 40 miles :pier hour.
B. Driving at an excessive sp·eed, having
due regard to the conditions then existing.
C. Operating carelessly and heedlessly without due caution and circumsp·ection.
D. Failing to keep a prop;er lookout.
E. Failing to keep· their truck under control.
F. Failing to drive on the right side of the
roadway.
G. Driving across the center line of the highway.
H. Swinging the trailer out of control.
I. Passing other cars going in the same
direction when they could not do so with reasonable safety as to other vehicles p·roceeding in the
opposite direction.
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J. F:ailing to control speed to avoid collision.
K. Flashing lights on and off, interfering
with the vision of the deceased.
Speed is mentioned in three sub-paragraphs, namely
(a), (h) and (j). Control is repeated in sub~paragraphs
(e), (h) and (j). c·ertainly by no stretch of the irnagination were lights a p·roximate cause of the collision, and
it was error to incor:piorate sub-p'aragraph (k) in the
court's instructions.
Lights were not shown to have been a cause of the
accident and there was error in submitting the issue of
lights to the jury under the court's instruction No. 16.
Undue emphasis is further placed upon all plaintiff's allegations of neglige~ce notwithstanding the failure of p·roof with respect thereto, in that the. court
throughout its instructions continuously hy reference
·refers hack to the -court's instruction No. 1 referring
to suh-p·aragraphs (a) to (k), inclusive, hereinabove
mentioned.
The authorities are numerous holding that it is error
to submit alleged grounds of negligence to the jury
when there is not supporting e·vidence. ·See :State Bank
of Beaver ·County v. Hollingshead (Utah), 25 Pac. (2d)
612·, and others.
{F)' FAIL·URE TO· INS:TRUCIT A JURY ON
D·EFENDANT·s' ·T:HEORY 0'F T·HE CASE.
D'e.fendants' requested instru·ctions were, in practical effect, refused in their entirety and defendant was
therehy dep~rived of the right to have the jury instructed
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as to the legal a-nd sta.hdory dtuties of deoe,ase:d in their
application to the law of contributory negligence.
l

Tn1e, contributory negligence was referred to in a
general sense but there was no instruction giv:en explaining to the jury the general law of contributory negligence as expressly requested by defendants' requested
instruction No. 3 ('Tr. 202). Defendants were entitled
to have that matter clearly instructed upon so that the
jury would be enaJbled to aiJ;ply the law and maJke proper
application of the law to the particular facts.
(a) It is also true that the court, by its instructions numbered 17, 18 and 19 ( Tr. 2·37 -9), instructed
the jury relative to ~ertain statutory duties, but such
instructions were me~e abstract statem,ents of law without application to the facts and without p·articular app·lication to the specific ·duties of deceased as contained in
defendants' requested instructions numbered 9 CTr. 206.)
and 11 ('Tr. 208).
It has frequently been held error to give abstract
propositions of law without P'articular app·lication to
the facts and ~ircumstances of the case. See Everts v.
Worrell, 5'8 Utah 238, 197 Pac. 1043, and Jensen v. Utah
Ry. Co., 72 Utah 366, 270 Pac. 349. In the latter case
the court, at page 385 of the Utah Report criticizes
instructions, which while correct as ahstract pro!IJ!Ositions, are at fault "in stating propositions * * * unrelated and unrestricted to and regardless of conditions or
circumstances.'' Said the court:
''As a general rule a trial court should not
leave the jury to apply more general principles
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of law to a case, as here was done hy the defendant's requests. The court should give the jury
what the law is as applied to the facts either
stated or assumed, and if so found by the jury.
The rule is well settled that instructing a jury,
a mere aJbstract or general statement as to the law
should he avoided, .and that all instructions should
be applicaJble to evidence on either one or the
other of the respective theories of the parties.
Instructions which are not so applicahle, though
abstractly they may he correct, are not helpful
to the jury, are apt to be misleading and to be
impTO!IJierly applied.''
We p~articularly direct attention to the court's instruction No. 18, for illustration, which reads:
''You are instructed that a driver proceeding upon a roadway of two or more traffic lanes
in either direction, shall drive such vehicle upon
the right half of such roadway.''
·such instruction is such a mere ruhstract statement of
law as to he of no aid to the jury in its application of the
law to the fajc.ts. The instruction is also misleading in
that the abstract ~proposition of law therein stated could
have no possible. application to the case except upon
the assum:p~tion that the vehicles ·were in fact travelling
irn opp1osite direC"tiovrtAs. IThe court should not by its instructions assume facts to be· true which are disputed
in the evidence, in this case not 'P'r:oiVen ·at all.
·The giving of such albstract statements of law was
held to he reversible error in M·orrison v. Perry (Utah),
140 P'ac. ('2:d), 772. We invite attention to the following
p1ortion of the opinion:
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••The cowrt fa.?· led t1o properly sepa.!f1a:t:e the
theories of the p1a'r'ties, but instead; gla'(I)B gene:'ral
instrUctior~JS treating the rig'hts ,wnd: du.ties of each
drive.r as b·eing mJUt'1J)al, without reg.ard to defen.dariJt's theory as t-o deceta.sed's negligence in firsit
bemg on his w~rong side of the highw,ay. Defendant is entitled to have his case submitted to the
jury on any theory justified by p-roper evidence.
Morgan v. Bingham ·Stage Coach Line ·Co., 75
Utah 87, 283 P. 160; Hartley v. Salt L·ake City,
41 Utah 121, 124 P. 5·2·2; Pratt v. Utah Light &
'Traction 'Co., 57 Utah 7, 16·9 P. 86S; Smith v.
Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, ·279· P. 893; Martineau v.
Hanson, 47 Utah ·549, 155 P. 432·.

''Each party is entitled to have his theory
of the case presented in such a way a.s to aid the
jury and not eonfuse it. In Toone v. J.P. O'Neill
C:onstruction Company, 40 Utah 2'65, 121 P. 10,
16, the court suggests the :better p·ractice of pTesenting the parties' theories of the ease to the
jury: 'One way the court might have followed in
charging the jury would have lbeen to charge
them in sep~arate instructions, first, in accordance
with :respondent's evidence; and, second, in accordance with app·ellant's evidence which relate·d
to the proposition covered hy the instruction in
question, and in each instruction have directe;d
the jury to return a verdict in accordance with
their findings U!POn that question.' ''
D·efendants.' requested instruetions were based upon
specific sbatvuto.ry duties governing the conduct of ideceas·ed in the op~eration of the .automo'bile he was driving.
We direct the court's attention to defendants' requested
instruction No. 8 ('Tr. 205) based upon the p·rovision
of Sec. 57-7-122 of the Motor Vehicle Code as follows:
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"You ar;e instructed that the laws of the
State of Utah where there is a four lane highway
provide that a vehicle overtaking another vehicle
p·roceeding in the same direction shall pass to
the left thereof at a safe distance, and that the
driver of an overtaken vehicle shall give way to
the right in favor of the overtaking vehicle on
aud1ble signal. 'Therefore, if you find from the
evidence that the automobile driven by the deceased, Dale Tuttle, was traveling south in the
west lane of traffic, and that the defendant Heath
H. Cornette, was about to overtake and pass the
Tuttle automobile and had sounded an audible
signal for such purpose, but that said Dale Tuttle
negligently failed to give way to the right in favor
of defendants' truck and negligently turned in
front of the truck and that such negligence proximately contributed in any degree to 0ause the
collision, then plaintiffs cannot recover and your
verdict must be in favor of defendants and against
the plaintiffs, no caus-e of action.'' ('Tr. 205)
Defendants were entitled to have the jury instructed
upon such statutory duty and in such form as it could
be ~ap!plied by the jury to the rule of contributory negligence.
We direct attention to defendants' requested instruction No. 9 ( Tr. 206:), which asked the court to instruct
the jury relative to the duties of deceased as defined in
Sec. 57-7-1'33 of the Motor Vehicle Code. The statute
mentioned specifically p~laces the duty upon the deceased
if he was traveling South to not:
'''turn * * * from a direct course upon a
highway unless and until such movement can
be made with reasona:ble safety and then only
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after * * * giving an ap prop·riate signal * * * ''
1

by, see See. 57-7-135, "hand and arm extended
horizontally."
We are not una""-are of the fact that the court did
give a sen1blance of part of the rule in its instruction
No. 19·, but such instruction was entirely in the abstract
and did not present defendants' theory of the defense
to the jury.
We further ·direct the court's attention to the fact
that the jury was not instructed with respect to deceased's dbligation to keep a prop·er lookout and hefore
turning to look and ascertain if there was any ap·proa:ching traffic. Defendants' by their requested instruction
No. 10 (Tr. 207), made a specific request, defining de·ceased's duty regarding lookout and its ap·plication
respecting defendants' theory of contr~butory negligence as follows :
"You are instructed that if the driver of an
automobile undertakes to make a left hand or U
turn upon the highway, or to turn his car to the
left for any other purpose, it is his duty before
doing so to look and ascertain if there is any
traffic app~roaching from the rear and if there
is any app,roaching which would constitute a
hazard to wait or stop·, if necessary, until it is safe
to turn, and then only after indicating hy an
appropriate signal his intention to do so. In
looking for approaching traffic, it is not sufficient
to say that one looked but ·did not see that which
should have been seen, because the driver of an
automobile about to turn has the duty not only
to look but to s-ee and observe with sufficient care
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as to see such vehicles as are approaching within
,plain view and to heed their presence. Therefore,
if you find from the evidence that the deceased,
Dale Tuttle, was prooeeeding south near the west
edge of the highway and negligently turned in
front of ap~pro~ching traffic without first determining if there was any approaching from the
north which would affect his safety, then he was
negligent, and if you find that such negligence
proximately contributed in any degree to cause
the collision, then plaintiffs cannot recover a.nd
your verdict must 'be in favor of defendant and
against the plaintiffs, no eause of action." (Tr.
207)
Similarly, defendants' requested instruction definIng deceased's duty under the terms of Sec. 57-7-128,
should have been given in such form as to present defendants' theory of defense instead of in the abstract as
given hy the court in its instruction No.17.
There were other instructions requested by defendants which were not given by the court, or if given, were
only given in p~art. Such requests were intended to present defendants' theory of the ease to the jury and we
feel that the court must have lost sight o.f the estrublished
rule that "defendant is entitled to have his case submitted to the jury on any theory justified by proper
evidence. * * * '' Morrison v. p·erry, supra.

3. REFERENCE T·O INSiURAN,CE IND,EMNIFIC.A:TIO·N.
Counsel for plaintiff couldn't resist the temptation
throughout the trial in malting reference to a Mr. Kunz,
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an insurance adjuster who had taken some statements,
and this matter was effectively driven home to the jury
when Carol Ellis, plaintiffs' own 'vitness and ~liient
of plaintiffs' counsel was ~ross-examined for the i)tUrpose
of refreshing her memory as to what she had told
Officer Halliday.

"Q. Did you tell anybody following the accident
that the car which was involved in a collision with the truck was the car which had
'been preceding you going south ibefore the
accident?
A. Yes, I made that statement.
Q. Who did you make that statement to?
A. To the in81.llrarnce inv-e1stigavor.
Q. And did you make a statement to anyone else?
A. I don't recall.'' CTr. 90)
Then when being questioned biY p~laintiffs' counsel
resp~cting the statement given to Mr. Kunz, she volunteered:

''A. Oh, he came in and introduc:ed himself and I
introduced him to Mr. Creer, and he expJained
his 'being there. Wanted to talk to me ahout
it and wanted me to give him a statement. He
sat down at a desk and started chatting about
the accident and talking it over with us, and
insisted that I give him something definite,
and I just was very reluctant to even discuss
it because I didn't understand his position,
who he was or why he was there. Siaid he
('Tr. 105) w~as from the insuran~ce oomp:arny.
MR. HANSO.N:

Just a moment. If Your
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Honor, p;lease, we object to th9.t part, referring to
the insurance comp;any, as being improper and
unfair. The witness has obviously talked to her
-counsel herore, and he knows that's unfair. That
issue has nothing to do with this case, and I o'bject to it at this time .and ~ite it as error, prejudicial error.'' ( Tr .106)
The courts have repeatedly eondemned the practice
of permitting a friendly witness to make reference to
an insurance adjuster or the insurance company either
directly or indirectly. Such mis-conduct is held to he prejudicial and revers~hle error and is not cured by a mere
statement to the jury to disregard the statement. See
Morris on v. Perry, supra, and Sallias v. Affle~ck, supra.
In the M orrisvow v. Perry case, reference was made
to insurance when a witness, Penrose, referred to the
person who took a statement from him in the follo·win~
manner:

''A. I understand from this other man here that
he was an attorney with an insurance outfit.
·That is what he told me he was. He did not
tell me he "\Vas an attorney.''
In Consolirjated Motors Inc. v. Ketcham, (Ariz.) 66
Pac. (2d) 246, on cross examination of one of the defendants, p~laintiff's counsel concerning a statement, asked,
'·'Who did you make it to~" The answer, "A lawyer for
the insurance company, at that time, Charlie Young.'' In
reversing the case, the :court said :
''It will be seen that the rule lai:d down by us
is, that unless it ap~pea.rs that the plaintiff was
entirely without blame in creating the situation
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w'hich caused the reference to the question of insurance, w·e have al\Yays reversed the case whenever the matter \Yas in any way brought to the attention of the jury, regardless of whether it came
through a witness, for plaintiff or defendant, or
upon direct or cross-exan1ination. It is not sufficient that plaintiff did not mean to bring out the
prohibited matter, but he must mean not to.
''It is evident from the cross-examination,
which referred to a specific signed statHment made
at a certain time, that counsel for plaintiff had
in mind one particular statement o.f which he had
knowledge. We are of the opinion that since this
must have been true, it was the duty of counsel,
even if the statement itself might be admissible
for any purpose, to so carefully guard the manner
in which it was introduced as to, if possible, avoid
any reference to the insurance eompany. This he
might easily have done hy issuing a sub~poena
duces tecum to the person to whom he knew it was
made, and then, since it was a signed and written
statement, identifying it through the testimony of
the defendant, and if it in any particular thereof
was admissible, offering or using it in evidence.
He -chose not to do this but went into the matter in
such a manner that he should have known it was
but natural for the question of insurance to come
out during the cross-examination. * * * In view of
what we have said as to the highly prejudicial effect of allowing a jury even to surmise from statements made during the trial that baek of the nominal defendants there stands an insurance company, and the great care which a plaintiff must
use to see that the matter does not come into the
case through any fault of his, we are of the op~in
ion that the case must be reversed for a new trial
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on this ground, regardless of the other assign.
ments of error.''
In Polwnd v. DUJnbarr, (Maine) 157 Atl. 381, counsel
for the defense had introduced without objection a statement nf the plaintiff unfavoralhle to her ease. On crossexamination, plaintiff's counsel after having plaintiff
identify her signature asked: '' 'After the statement
was made and signed, did you then learn who this man
represented~' A. 'I did.' Q. 'And whom did he represent~' " and over defendant's ofbj,ction, she answered,
'' 'The insurance company.' '' 'The court held this reversible error, being prejudicial hearsay.
See also SimpBon v. Founwat~on Compamy, (N.Y.)
9'5 N.E. 10; Flemilng v. Hartrick, ·(W.Va.) 141 S.E. 628;
L:avigne v. BallaJYI)tyne, (R.I.) 17 Atl. (2d) 845; Levy v.
J. L. Mott !.ron Works, 1'27 N.Y. S. 506·; H·ankms v. Hall,
(Okla.) ·54 Pac. (2'd) 609; Bratten v. White, (Okla.) 75
Pac. (2d) 474; Cam,eron v. Pacific Lime (JJn(], Gypsum
Comp1arny, (Ore.) 144 Pac. 446; and Manigold v. B!Jack
River Traction Company, 80 N.Y. S. 861.
4.

ERROR IN DENYING MOTION FOR NEvV

TRIAL.
'This Honorable Court is undoubtedly aware of the
rule res~pecting the duty of the lower court to grant a
new trial when the verdict is contrary to the weight of the
evidence as w·ell as when a verdict is unsupported by
probative evidence. Such duty is espeeially important
when the jury was improp·eriy instructed to the prejudice of defendants ·denying their right to a fair trial. The
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Yerdict being contrary to the only evidence ·w'hich showed
ho\Y the accident occurred, a ne\v trial should have he:en
granted on seYeral grounds.

IV.
SU)l~IARY

_._l\ND ·C.ONCLUSION

In ~conclusion may we say that the extreme ends to
''hich counsel for plaintiffs 'vent in making every conceivable allegation of negligence, thirteen in all, which
were in no sense connected with the eause of the accident
and in no possible sense of the word shown to have prorimately caused the collision, is proof that such allegations
were not founded on fact.
When one considers the court'3 instructions consisting of abstract propositions of law without ap·plication to the facts and circumstances and which wer·e
ado~ptted almost verbatim from p~laintiffs' requests, together with the confusion caused by the unfounded arguments of counsel based upon the erroneous assumption
that the Tuttle car was traveling north, it is no small
wonder that the jury, out of such confusion and sympathy and in the belief there was insurance, ~erroneously
returned the verdict it did.
It is fundamental and the first obligation of the
courts that cases he decided upon the actual and prohative evidence. :The burden of proof cannot he said to
be sustained by confusion created through collateral
matters and assumed inferences and conclusions not
proven by evidence.
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'The truth is, as the parties to this suit and eye witnesses lmow full well, that the collision was caused when
de·ceased, p roaee:diln.g sowth, suddenly turned left in front
of defendants' truck, and defendants' motion for a directed verdict made both hefore and after the verdict,
should have ibeen sustaind on ea;ch of the grounds herein assigned.
1

When the court decided to submit the cas·e to the
jury, surely if there was any such justification, defendants were entitled to have instructions given which would
not plaJce upon defendants a greater duty than the law required and were likewise entitled to have correlative instructions given defilwing the leg'al arnd s~atutory duties
of deceased resp'eoting the Zaw of the ro·ad.
These and several other errors herein discussed
effectually precluded defendants from obtaining a fair
trail and the lower court failed in its obligation to direct
a verdict-in any event, to grant a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

STEWART, ICANNO·N &
E. F. BAL:DWIN, JR.,

HAN~SON,

A t:t orneys for Def ern)(Jxmts
and A pp1el~am.ts.
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